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FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN THE REGULATORY PROCESSt
HENRY E. HOWELL, JR.*
When "populism" swept the country in the late nineteenth century
on the wings of William Jennings Bryan's silver-tongued oratory, state
legislatures sought to regulate the powerful and monopolistic public
utility companies in accordance with the public interest.1 However
viable the concept of regulation, it has been perverted in practice so
that many regulatory agencies throughout America have become cap-
tured by the "regulated" industries.2
In Virginia, as in other states, a populist-oriented movement has sought
to redress the improprieties which result when agencies are subject to
undue influence from industry. Within the past decade in Virginia,
our movement has succeeded in exposing discriminatory underwriting
practices employed by automobile insurance companies which previ-
ously had been condoned by the State Corporation Commission.3 Addi-
tionally, we have been instrumental in ensuring that due process of law
is accorded to public interest intervenors participating in Commission
hearings;4 indeed, almost $5 million recently was restored to Virginia
consumers as compensation for past denials of due process in regulatory
proceedings5
In addition to securing important procedural and substantive reform
in regulatory matters, concerned consumer representatives have played
an important role in preventing unjustified rate increases sought by pub-
lic utilities. For example, in 1972, a $79 million rate increase sought by
the Virginia Electric and Power Company was reduced to a $41 million
t±This Article elaborates upon the purpose, theory, and legal authority underlying
the author's appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia in Howell v. S.C.C., Record No.
8102 (appeal pending, Supreme Court of Virginia, October term, 1972). The author
wishes to gratefully acknowledge the research assistance and writing contribution of
Howard E. Copeland, third-year law student at the University of Virginia, in the
preparation of the brief in that case and the formulation of this Article.
*LL.B., University of Virginia. Lieutenant Governor, the Commonwealth of Virginia.
1. See J. HciCKs, Tim PopuLisr REVOLT (1931); R. HOFSrADTER, THE AGE OF REFORm
(1955). See also A. J. G. PRiEsT, 1 PRINCIPLES OF PuBsuc Unrry REGUlATION 5-9 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J.). See note
17 inftra & accompanying text.
3. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 776, 167 S.E.2d 322 (1969).
4. Board of Supervisors v. C & P Tel. Co, 212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d 30 (1971).
5. C & P Tel. Co. v. Arlington County, No. 8020 (Va., Nov. 27, 1972).
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increase.6 Consumer involvement also played an integral role in the
Commission's rejection of a premature application for rate increases
from the C & P Telephone Company, arguing that the rate increase was
based on an improper debt ratio and that the utility had been granted
a prior rate increase less than a year earlier.7
This Article will recite and examine the legal and political underpin-
nings that have served as the foundation for these efforts. Additionally,
it will consider the desirability of public participation in hearings before
the Stare Corporation Commission. Specifically, it will be argued that
free transcripts of SCC hearings should be made available to concerned
members of the public. At present, the financial burden of acquiring
such transcripts has the unfortunate effect of discouraging public in-
volvement. It will be submitted that sound regulatory thinking sup-
ports the proposition that the costs of transcripts should be borne either
by the state or by the rate applicant.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
The basic premises of public interest law in this Commonwealth can
be found in the Constitution of Virginia in the words of George Mason,
which have remained unchanged since 1776. First, government is re-
minded of whom it serves and in what capacity: "[A] 11 power is vested
in, and consequently derived from, the people, that magistrates are their
trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them." 8 The Con-
stitution then provides a standard of performance and delivers an ulti-
matum:
[O]f all the various modes and forms of government, that is best
which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and
safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of mal-
administration; and whenever any government shall be found in-
adequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the com-
munity hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal.9
These are not only words for all seasons, but a bill of rights for all
people. From this bold statement, it is clear that all forms of govern-
6. VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (Va., June 28, 1972).
7. C & P Tel. Co., S.C.C. No. 19152 (Va., Sept., 1972).
8. VA. CONSr. art. I, § 2 (emphasis supplied).
9. Id. art. I, § 3.
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ment are to serve the "public interest" and that it is the duty of all
public servants to reform any system that does not serve the people.
The need for government regulation of business in order to preserve
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States at the turn of the century. The
classic statement of this need was expressed by Chief Justice Waite in
Murnn v. Illinois:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to
the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled
by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has thus created. 10
From this broad policy foundation, today's public interest lawyer
is able to allege and represent a public interest in almost every substan-
tial business activity and, even more certainly, in every governmental
action. Both the general provisions of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution and the specific dictates of the Consti-
tution and Code of Virginia" create a standard of "fair and reasonable"
public utility rates, one which a public interest lawyer may enforce.
In a sense, the public interest lawyer presumes to speak for the public
without the benefit of office, the mandate of an election, or the statu-
tory duty to formulate and enforce public policy. However, it is the
logical implication of a democratic society that everyone is his own
"private attorney general" 12 and is empowered to enforce the rights
vested in the public by statutory and constitutional authority.
THE DESIRABILITY AND FACILITATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Intervention in and appeal of administrative decisions by the public
is a valuable process in a democratic society. The State Corporation
10. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). See also Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations,
262 U.S. 522, 536 (1923).
11. VA. CoNsr. art. IX, §§ 2, 4; VA. CoDE ANN. § 12.1-39 (Cum. Supp. 1971). Id.
§ 56-239 (Cum. Supp. 1972). For a judicial interpretation of these requirements, see
Norfolk v. VEPCO, 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E2d 940 (1955).
12. See, e.g., Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965).
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Commission of Virginia permitted the participation of public interest
representatives in hearings on important public matters long before
federal agencies solved the problem of standing. The Commission's Rule
10 provides: "[A]ny interested party may intervene in a case by
attending the hearing and executing and filing with the bailiff a notice
of appearance on forms provided for the purpose .... , Rule 8 is just
as permissive in defining parties and public interest representatives:
[A] ny party may appear in person or by attorney. A foreign at-
torney may appear with a Virginia attorney. A person who is
not a lawyer may not represent clients before the Commission,
but may testify as a 'witness on behalf of the public, or of a cham-
ber of commerce or other association, or of a corporation of which
he is a full-time employee or by which he has been employed as
an expert witness .... 14
As a result of these rules, intervenors before the SCC have not encoun-
tered the difficulties in gaining standing to participate in and appeal
from agency decisions which have confronted public interest groups
at the federal level. It is only in recent years that the problem of
standing has been resolved with respect to public interest groups
appearing before federal agencies. 5
The policy of unrestricted participation reflected by the Commis-
sion's rules appears to reflect an understanding of the value and desir-
ability of public participation in public decision-making. The impor-
tance of intervention is stated succinctly by Professor Ernest Gellhorn:
The demand for broadened public participation in governmental
decision making rests on the belief that government, like all
other institutions, rarely responds to interests not represented in
its deliberations. An administrative agency is usually exposed only
to the views of its staff, whose position necessarily blends a num-
ber of discrete public interests, and of private persons with a
clear financial stake in the proceedings. The emergence of individ-
uals and groups willing to assist administrative agencies in identi-
fying interests deserving protection, in producing relevant evi-
13. VA. S.C.C.R. PpAc. & P. 10.
14. Id. 8 (emphasis supplied).
15. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
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dence and argument suggesting appropriate action, and in closing
the gap between the agencies and their ultimate constituents pre-
sents an opportunity to improve the administrative process.' 6
Public participation is especially important in rate making, where
the public's economic interests are directly at stake. A recurring prob-
lem has been identified by Judge Skelly Wright, who has inquired
"whether the regulatory agency is unduly oriented toward the indus-
try it is designed to regulate, rather than the public interest it is designed
to protect." 17 In Virginia, the "old Commission," which was composed
of Judges Catterall, Hooker and Dillon, was overly sympathetic to
utility requests. The fact that it was a "captured agency" is evidenced
by the close-working relationship between a regulated utility monopoly
and the Commission, which resulted in an illegal 38-minute hearing in
1969.18
There is, however, adequate opportunity for public interest inter-
venors to ameliorate the effect of this imbalance by performing the
duties neglected by public officials. A public interest advocate finds no
legal barrier to intervention before the Commission. 9 If he fails to
persuade the Commission of his position, he may consult the Constitu-
tion and Code of Virginia" for any violations of law to assign as error
on appeal. Once a person has become a "party intervenor," he may
appeal, as of right, by authority of constitution and statute,21 as well as
rule of court.22 The work of the public interest intervenor is to supple-
16. Gellhorn, Public Participation in Admzinistrative Proceedings, 81 YALE Lj. 359,
403 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn]. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where,
and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.
525 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cramton]; Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the
People, 57 VA. L. REv. 1069 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lazarus & Onek]; Comment,
Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 702
(1972).
17. Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
18. Board of Supervisors v. C & P Tel. Co., 212 Va. 57, 182 S..2d 30 (1971). The
recent decision to trim and postpone a rate application, C & P Tel. Co, S.C.C. No.
19152 (Va., Sept. 1972), gives reason to hope that the newly constituted Commission
will decline to engage in ex parte arrangements with the utilities, and that the Com-
mission's General Counsel aggressively will pursue and represent the public interest.
VA. CONsT. art. IX, § 2.
19. See notes 13 & 14 supra & accompanying text.
20. See note 11 supra & accompanying text.
21. VA. CODE AiIJ. § 12.1-39 (Cum. Supp. 1971); Id. § 56-239 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
The Virginia Constitution provides that: "any party in interest, or any party aggrieved
by any final finding, order or judgment of the Commission, shall have, of right, an
appeal to the Supreme Court...." VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 4.
22. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:18 (g).
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ment the representation of the public required of the Attorney General 3
and the Commission's General Counsel. 4
While the public interest intervenor before the SCC need not be
concerned with his right of standing, there are serious practical diffi-
culties which may frustrate this right. At the time of this writing, the
appeal on the merits of the current VEPCO rate case is in abeyance
while legal attempts are being made to overcome the financial barriers
presently limiting access to the appeals court.26
FnANcrAL BARRIERS TO APPEAL: TRANSCRIPTS
The public interest in fair and reasonable rates cannot be safeguarded
effectively if appeal from Commission decisions is not fully available.
Since most public interest representatives are somewhat impecunious as
to their public interest activities, the primary barrier to appeal is a want
of financial resources with which to prosecute their case. In order to
enhance participation in the policy-making process by these persons,
it is necessary to reduce their expenses. One important expense that
has become an obstacle to public involvement is the cost of obtaining
necessary transcripts. Reduction of this unnecessarily prohibitive ex-
pense is crucial, and the means by which such a reduction could be
implemented merit examination.
This inquiry may be facilitated by reference to the pending VEPCO
case, where the right of public intervenors to obtain transcripts at the
expense of the regulated utility is at issue. 7  The Virginia Rules of
23. VA. CoDn ANt. H 2.1-133.1 to 133.3 (Cum. Supp. 1972). This statute creates
a Division of Consumer Counsel in the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia,
but provides only one lawyer and no expert staff, under present budgetary allowances.
Although this is a laudable concept, it is presently inadequate to deal with the com-
plexity of issues presented in rate hearings and is plagued with the inherent bias of
being a part of the Attorney General's Office, which represents the Commission in
many instances. A better implementation of the public defender concept would be
through the creation of an independent "Consumer Protection Agency," consolidating
the presently fragmented consumer efforts and extending its powers and resources to
meet the challenge of representing the public. Even the efforts of such an independent
agency could be supplemented by individual consumer representatives, intervening to
represent interests of discrete portions of the public.
24. VA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; VA. CoDE AN. § 12.1-18 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
25. VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (Va., Sept. 20, 1972) (appeal noted but not acted upon
by the Supreme Court).
26. VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (Va., Sept. 20, 1972) (order denying motion entered
July 19, 1972).
27. VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (Va., Sept. 20, 1972).
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Court 28 and the Virginia Code29 provide that the Clerk of the Commis-
sion is required to prepare and transmit the record to the Supreme Court
of Virginia whenever an appellant files a notice of appeal from a Com-
mission decision. Receipt of the transcript is necessary to perfect an
appeal as of right, and the Clerk currently requires that the appellant
pay a copying fee of 50 cents per page30 before processing the tran-
script. Two alternatives to this costly procedure are available, but the
Clerk and the Commission generally have been unwilling to utilize them.
First, according to an interpretation of the Attorney General of Vir-
ginia,3 1 if the appellant presents the Clerk with a certified transcript
purchased by the appellant or by the rate applicant, the Clerk may
certify this transcript as part of the record and transmit it without
charge. Second, the Clerk is empowered to certify and transmit the
original transcript which he receives from the Commission reporter. 2
This procedure was authorized by the Commission in the current
VEPCO litigation; however, the extraordinary authorization apparently
was granted only to preserve the rights of the Lieutenant Governor's
office to pursue an appeal on the merits of the rate increase decision.
Thus, unless the Virginia Supreme Court rules that public interest in-
tervenors without adequate funds are entitled to have the record trans-
mitted at no charge, the Clerk will seek to retrieve the transcript and
will refuse to follow this exceptional procedure in the future.3t As a re-
sult, public interest intervenors will be forced to bear the cost of trans-
mitting the record, either by having the Clerk copy his transcript or by
28. VA. Sup. CT.R. 5:18 (d), (e).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 12.1-40 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
30. Id. § 13.1-124 (Cum. Supp. 1971). The third and final paragraph reads: 'Tor
making up, certifying and transmitting a record on appeal the clerk shall charge and
collect fifty cents per page for all papers necessary to be copied, and in addition, the
sum of five dollars." (emphasis supplied).
31. Opinion letter from Attorney General Andrew P. Miller to Lieutenant Governor
Henry E. Howell, Jr., October 5, 1972.
32. The Commission routinely purchases an original and three copies of the tran-
script of every proceeding. Thus, there is a certified transcript available for trans-
mission without any additional cost to the Commonwealth, and with little additional
inconvenience to the Commission. Unlike the federal administrative system, the par-
ticipants do not subsidize the agency's copies by an exclusive contract with a re-
porting firm, and there is no reason that the Commission could not order another copy
at its expense to accommodate public interest interveners. For a detailed description
of the federal system and its problems, see Gellhorn, supra note 16, at 390-93; Lazarus &
Onec, supra note 16, at 1099.
33. Opinion letter from Commissioner Junie L. Bradshaw to Lieutenant Governor
Henry E. Howell, Jr., October 26, 1972.
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purchasing one. In either case, this cost is estimated by the Commission
staff to be about $2,000.
In addition to the expense of transmitting the record, an appellant
presently must obtain his own copy of the transcript of proceedings
in order to "designate the appendix" in accordance with the Rules of
Court. 4 The designation of the appendix involves the tedious and ex-
pensive work of choosing the portions of the record that support the
appellant's case and typing those passages to accompany the opening
brief. This system is in lieu of the former "Record on Appeal," which
was printed and was also costly.
The court has the option, by authority of Rule 5:41, to dispense with
the requirement that public interest intervenors and appellants prepare
an appendix. Ideally, this rule would be applied in those actions where
representatives of the public who are without large means are seeking
to represent the public interest. Elimination of the expense of preparing
the appendix would facilitate public participation, as would the elimi-
nation, as authorized by Rule 5:35, of the multiple copy requirement.
Even if these burdens on public participation are removed, the public
interest intervenor still needs a copy of the transcript for the prepara-
tion of his brief. As the Commission's opinion in the VEPCO case ex-
plains, a "public copy" of the transcript is available in the Commis-
sion's office.3 5 However, the opinion also indicates that the copy may
not be removed from that office, and it is extremely doubtful that a law-
yer or his clerical staff could work effectively at a public office. Pro-
fessor Gellhorn confirms that public interest lawyers who appear before
federal agencies find that working with the "public copy" is awkward
to the point of being unfeasible 6
Thus, under current procedures, an appellant from a decision of the
Commission must bear a substantial financial burden; in the present
TEPCO case this amounts to approximately $4,000. One of the ques-
tions the Supreme Court should consider in connection with the present
appeal is whether the shifting of this burden would threaten the fiscal
health of the Commonwealth, whose government administers a five bil-
lion dollar budget biannually, or of VEPCO, whose fiscal health is
guaranteed by the very hearings at issue. The question should be con-
sidered in light of the valuable services which may result from such a
minor expenditure. If the primary purpose of the ratemaking process
34. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:35-41.
35. VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (Va., Sept. 20, 1972) (Catterall, Comm'r).
36. Gellhorn, supra note 16, at 392.
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is to serve the public interest, surely such an expense is justified by its
assurance that an important and widely held point of view will be
represented until the case has been carried to completion. By shifting
the cost of transcripts either to the Commonwealth or to VEPCO, the
expenses of representing the public and consumers would be spread
among millions of members of the public through taxes, or among mil-
lions of consumers through utility rates. These would be appropriate
means to assure representation of the public interest.
While these and other litigation costs would add to the tax or rate
burden of the public, the increased burden would be negligible under
a properly drawn Commission rule. In many instances, public interest
intervenors could return more to taxpayers and consumers than would
be expended. For example, the public interest appeal of an SCC in-
surance rate decision in 1969 produced an annual savings to Virginians
of several million dollars in premiumsaT In that case, the costs of appeal
were borne by the state AFL-CIO. The majority of public interest
cases, however, will be dependent upon the private resources of a
public intervenor. Such a system cannot assure the effective representa-
tion of significant and widely held points of view, especially under the
more costly rules of procedure now in effect.
The arguments developed above rest on the premise that the cause
of non-governmental public interest representation is indigence. In
shifting the financial burden of appeal, no showing should be required
of public interest intervenors other than an informal declaration that
they lack the necessary funds, rather than the normal indigency require-
ments for proceeding in forma pauperis.
These proposals are modest in comparison to the advances achieved
by public interest groups practicing before some of the federal regula-
tory agencies. The decisions of these agencies should be persuasive to
the Commission, should the question arise before it again, and to the
Supreme Court of Virginia in the current VEPCO appeal.
THE DEVELOPING FEDERAL RuLE
The Federal Trade Commission has set the example in striking down
barriers to public participation in agency proceedings. In 1970, the
FTC set a valuable precedent by providing a free transcript, at gov-
ernment expense, to a group of law students (Students Opposing Unfair
Practices, Inc., or S.O.U.P.) who took action in opposition to deceptive
37. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 776, 167 S.E.2d 322 (1969).
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advertising of the Campbell Soup Company 8 Significantly, S.O.U.P.
was denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis, yet the group was
provided with a free transcript in recognition of the value of their
public service. Shortly after the FTC's action, the Federal Power Com-
mission established liberal guidelin'es for determining qualification for
free transcripts, but refused to allow an organization known as People
Organized to Win Effective Regulation (P.O.W.E.R.) to proceed in
forma pauperis and to receive a free transcript,3 9 because it had not
shown that it could not afford the FPC's bargain transcript rates of $15
per hearing. By contrast, the SCC has not promulgated financial hard-
ship guidelines and refuses to allow intervenors to proceed in forma
pauperis. It is not surprising that the FPC denied P.O.W.E.R.'s request
for $10,000 in advance fees and costs, since P.O.W.E.R. did not prove
its need or its unique ability to represent the public; its request was very
expensive, much larger than the cost of a single transcript that a pool
of intervenors would share under the proposed SCC rule. The FPC
also chose to rationalize its denial of resources to P.O.W.E.R. with the
argument that the Commission adequately represents the public interest.
While the FPC's pledge is laudable, the agency's own rules allow for
intervention by the public and even by indigents.
It is important to note that neither of these decisions required a
showing of technical indigency; rather, the decisions to provide public
interest groups with meaningful access to the regulatory decision-making
scheme was based upon an informal assessment of the potential contri-
bution to be made by the public interest participant and upon the hard-
ship presented by existing financial barriers.
In 1971, the Administrative Conference of the United States offered
this rationale and recommendation for the elimination of prohibitive
costs of regulatory participation:
The cost of participation in trial-type proceedings can render
the opportunity to participate meaningless. Agencies have an obli-
gation to minimize transcript charges, to avoid unnecessary filing
requirements, and to provide assistance in making information
available; and they should experiment with allowing access to
their staff experts as advisers and witnesses in appropriate cases.
The cost of recording formal proceedings should be borne by
the agencies, not by the parties or other participants to the pro-
38. Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2d 1011, 1016 (F.T.C. 1970).
39. Initial Rates for Future Sales of Natural Gas for All Areas, 44 F.P.C. 655, 657-79
(1970).
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ceeding (except to the extent that a person requests expedited
delivery). Existing contracts and arrangements should be revised
to provide for the availability, either through a reporting service
or the agency itself, of transcripts at a minimum charge reflecting
only the cost of reproducing copies of the agency's transcript.
Transcripts should be available without charge to indigent partici-
pants to the extent necessary for the effective representation of
their interests. Where the aggregate of these transcript costs
imposes a significant financial burden on the agency, the agency
should seek and Congress should provide the necessary additional
appropriation. 40
Of course, the battle to revise reporting contracts need not be fought
in Virginia, since the SCC pays for its transcripts. But the application
of Recommendation 28 to the Commission would provide public interest
intervenors with transcripts at little or no cost. The Administrative
Conference's reference to "the cost of reproducing" contemplates the
actual photocopy cost, estimated at three cents per page. This require-
ment was included in a recent federal statute providing that federal
agencies must allow "any person" to obtain a transcript at cost. 41 Such
a system would not be barred by the Code of Virginia, section 13.1-124,
since the Commission could transmit its original copy to the court and
provide a photocopy as a "working copy" without certifying such copy.
Furthermore, the clerk could loan the intervenor a transcript for one
day in order to permit the intervenor to obtain his own "working copy."
A further exposition of the logic of Recommendation 28 is provided
by Professor Gellhorn, author of the successful proposal:
There is an additional reason for insisting that agencies bear the
full cost of transcription. The agency usually initiates the hearing
and controls it, and it is the agency's responsibility to transcribe
the proceedings and maintain records. Transcription thus seems
to be a legitimate cost of government, and should be paid out of
general revenues.42
The immediate past Chairman of the Administrative Conference, Roger
C. Cramton, also has recommended the elimination of financial barriers
40. Reconmendation No. 28 of the Administrative Conf. of the United States-Public
Participation in Administrative Hearings, in ADMiNimsrATr CoN,. oF mm UNIED
STATES, REPORT 1970-1971 (1971). [reprinted in Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. LJ. 525,
549-50 (1972)].
41. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 11 (41 U.S.L.W. 67, 69 (Nov. 7, 1972)).
42. Gellhorn, supra note 16, at 392.
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which presently discourage intervention by public interest groups. In
concurring with Professor Gellhorn and the Administrative Conference,
he advocates limiting the transcript fee to the actual cost of duplication.
The payment of this "minimal" charge, he argues, is necessary to dis-
courage frivolous requests, and should be required except where an
indigent is being prosecuted by the government. 3 The argument that
a minimal charge is necessary to discourage frivolous requests is not
compelling, since an agency screening can accomplish the same purpose.
However, nominal charges are not unreasonable, since the thrust of
the proposal represents a worthwhile goal-the elimination of heavy and
unnecessary burdens.
The modesty of the proposal as to transcript expenses is revealed by
contrasting it with decisions granting public interest intervenors expert
witness' and attorneys' fees. 44 Again in this area, the Federal Trade
Commission was in the vanguard, deciding that indigent respondents
in an administrative prosecution are entitled to free legal defense, even
if the respondent is a corporation. 45 The Comptroller General recently
has approved the FTC's policy of paying the costs of transcripts for
indigent respondents and intervenors, as well as per diem expenses for
their attorneys and witnesses.46
There is also precedent for shifting the costs of attorneys' fees to
the regulated company. Although attorneys' fees are not normally a
taxable cost of litigation, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the shareholders' representatives in a derivative action are entitled to
reimbursement. The Court stated:
[T]he absence of an avowed class suit or the creation of a fund,
as it were, through stare decisis rather than through a decree-
hardly touch [es] the power of equity in doing justice as between a
party and the beneficiaries of his litigation....
Other cases have departed further from the traditional metes and
bounds of the doctrine, to permit reimbursement in cases where
43. Cramton, supra note 16, at 549-50.
44. Recommendation 28 proposes the use of the agency's own experts and file in-
formation, but stops short of attorney's fees or expert witness fees.
45. American Chinchilla Corp., 26 AD. L.2d 284 (F.T.C. 1969).
46. Opinion of the Comptroller General, 31 AD. L.2d 474, 475 (July 24, 1972):
"[Als in the case of an indigent respondent, and for the same reasons, appro-
priated funds of the Commission would be available to assure proper preparation" for
intervenors pleading hardship. The common reason for providing transcripts and other
resources to a respondent or intervenor is his "basic right to prepare and present his
case on a level substantially equal to that of his opposition. . . ." See the discussion of
the request which prompted the decision in Lazarus & Onek, supra note 16 at 1099-1100.
[Vol. 14:567
FINANCIAL BARRIERS
the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the members of
an ascertainable class, and where the Court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will op-
erate to spread the costs proportionately among them. ... 47
Acting on the premise that the ancient law on attorney's fees cannot
serve all modern needs, the Supreme Court and Congress have author-
ized the payment of attorneys' fees in order to encourage persons of
modest means to participate in important public policy decisions, thus
benefitting society at large .4  The application of this evolving policy
to ratemaking is apparent: while the public interest intervenor repre-
sents a class of persons-the public consumers-in an action which cre-
ates no tangible fund from damages, his costs should be compensated
since he has acted on behalf of the "class." This principle recently was
applied in an administrative proceeding. In an action between a public
interest group and a license applicant, a court of appeals reversed the
FCC and approved a settlement which included the applicant's payment
of the group's attorney fees.49
Two Washington lawyers have identified a line of cases applying this
doctrine:
The practice of awarding fees for the representation of unrepre-
sented interests is an established tradition in certain areas of regu-
lation, for example, in reorganizations supervised by the SEC
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. In such
areas, the courts have forged rules to maximize the incentives of
public interest representatives to appear. The Third Circuit even
went to the extent of requiring compensation where the represent-
atives initiated a challenge and subsequently failed, before the
agency and through multiple appeals, to win the benefits they
sought on behalf of the class which they represented. There is
nothing in the case-law to suggest that the judiciary would not
extend the same encouragement to agencies in fields affecting the
interests of consumers, minority groups, or environmentalists.50
In Virginia, the time may not be propitious for shifting attorneys'
and expert witness' fees, but there is compelling logic for providing
47. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US. 375, 393-94 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
48. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
49. KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603 (1970), reversed & remanded sub norn. Office of
Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir.,
March 28, 1972).
50. Lazarus & Onek, supra note 16, at 1102.
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representatives of the public with transcripts, which are the minimum
incidents of appeal. Favorable operation of this rule may subsequently
lead to its extension. However, since the SCC has rejected the argument
even as to transcripts, 51 it is necessary to persuade the Supreme Court
of Virginia that the constitutions of Virginia and the United States
require that public interest intervenors be provided free or low-cost
transcripts.
THE MANDATE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although it seems apparent that the Commission ought to provide
free transcripts to public interest intervenors, the question remains to
be considered whether such procedure is compelled by the mandates
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 11, of the Constitution of Virginia. In recent years,
the Supreme Court of the United States has demonstrated sensitivity
to the financial exigencies of litigants. This sensitivity is marked by an
intolerance toward judicial expenses which effectively deny persons with-
out sufficient means the right of access to the courts, on the ground that
such preclusion constitutes a denial of procedural due process and equal
protection of the laws. The "access rule" was announced by the Su-
preme Court in Griffin v. Illinois,52 where an indigent defendant was
granted the right to a free transcript in order to appeal his criminal
conviction. The general principle, which was destined to be applied
broadly, was stated by Mr. Justice Black:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would
deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and
one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review
accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in ad-
vance. It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Con-
stitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review
at all .... But that is not to say that a State that does grant appel-
late review can do so in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty. Appellate re-
view has now become an integral part of the Illinois trial system
for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from in-
vidious discriminations .... There can be no equal justice where
51. VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (Va., Sept. 20, 1972) (Catterall, Comm'r).
52. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts5 3
Although the transcript rule was developed for, and first applied to,
indigent criminal defendants, the principle recently has been extended
to several civil actions. The first of these cases was Boddie v. Connecti-
cut,54 which held that persons without the means to pay a filing fee for
a divorce action must be granted access to the courts. Although Griffin
was based on due process and equal protection, the majority opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan in Boddie emphasized due process:
Thus, although they assert here due process rights as would-be
plaintiffs, we think appellants' plight, because resort to the state
courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is akin
to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum
effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judi-
cial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic
sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests
in court. For both groups this process is not only the paramount
dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one.
In this posture we think that this appeal is properly to be resolved
in light of the principles enunciated in our due process decisions
that delimit rights of defendants compelled to litigate their dif-
ferences in the judicial forum., 5
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion emphasized the rationale
and re-asserted the equal protection theory.P6 More recently, the same
principle has been applied to persons appealing from adverse judgments
in housing eviction cases who could not afford to post required penalty
bonds.57
In Board of Supervisors v. C & P Telephone Company of Virginia,5 8
the Supreme Court of Virginia was sensitive to the need for procedural
due process in administrative proceedings. In that case, the failure of
the Commission to provide a full hearing on the evidence constituted
a denial of due process. It is not a difficult step to argue that the failure
to provide the incidents and requisites of appeal is similarly a denial of
53. Id. at 18-19.
54. 401 U.S. at 371 (1971).
55. Id. at 376-77.
56. Id. at 386.
57. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79 (1972).
58. 212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d 30 (1971).
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due process. If the right of appeal is frustrated because an intervenor
is without funds for that purpose, the argument also becomes one of a
denial of equal protection of the laws. However, to paraphrase Mr.
Justice Black's opinion in Griffin, there is no meaningful distinction
between the denial of procedural due process and equal protection in a
Commission hearing, and the denial of due process and equal protection
which results from placing an unbearable financial burden on the right
of appeal.
These arguments can be made meaningful through an examination of
the current VEPCO appeal. The appeal seeks, in effect, to shift a burden
that is grievously heavy for a group of public interest advocates, but
which would be of little fiscal consequence to VEPCO or the Com-
monwealth. The appeal seeks to compel the Commission to certify and
transmit its copy of the transcript of the hearing as part of the record
in the case, which could be done at no additional expense and with
little additional inconvenience to the Commission. Further, the appeal
asks that VEPCO or the Commission provide, under a well-defined
administrative rule, a "working copy" of the transcript to facilitate
preparation of the case on the merits of the rate increase. Finally, Rules
5:41 and 5:35 have been invoked in an effort to have the court relieve
qualified members of the class of public interest intervenors of the tasks
of designating the appendix and of presenting multiple copies of its
filing.
Either the Commission or VEPCO should be required to bear part
of the financial burden of public interest intervention so as to assure
full and effective representation of a significant portion of the public's
point of view. By this method, the cost of representation would be
spread among taxpayers or utility customers. To deny the public its
full representation because its advocates lack the funds to perfect and
prepare an appeal while the public's money, in the form of taxes and
rate revenue, assures the Commission staff and VEPCO of full repre-
sentation, is to discriminate invidiously against the public with its own
money.
Such a result is at least as deplorable as any of the fourteenth omend-
ment deprivations which appeared in the cases following the rationale
of Griffin v. Illinois. As in Boddie,59 for example, present practice in
Virginia precludes meaningful access to the civil courts by public in-
terest intervenors. The Supreme Court of Virginia and the Commission
are the only forums that can provide relief to the consumers who must
59. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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bear the burden of rate increases sought by monopolistic public utili-
ties."0 Since an intervenor is entitled by rule and statute to appeal Com-
mission decisions,61 the effective denial of access to an appeals court is
just as much a denial of procedural due process as would be the denial
of an opportunity to appear before the Commission in the first instance.
To deny such access simply because an intervenor's funds are insuffi-
cient to meet the expense of "representing" the public is a denial of
equal protection of the laws, since industry invariably has the means to
appeal. The fact that such financial discrimination exists is particularly
aggravating when it is recognized that industry's representation is paid
for by revenues derived from the very persons against whose interests
the discrimination works-che consumers of the public utility.
FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPOSED RULE
There is no cause to be alarmed by the implications of adopting the
present proposal. The Commission or the court can develop a standard
by which to judge whether the public interest intervenor's contribution
to the process is sufficient to justify aiding the group. A model rule
is that used by the Federal Trade Commission in evaluating S.O.U.P.,
Inc. as a worthy intervenor:
The thrust of our opinion in Campbell Soup is that before the
Commission will allow intervention into its proceedings, it must
be demonstrated that (1) the persons seeking such intervention
desire to raise substantial issues of law or fact which would not
otherwise be properly raised or argued, and (2) the issues thus
raised are of sufficient importance and immediacy to warrant an
additional expenditure of the Commission's limited resources on a
necessarily longer and more complicated proceeding in that case,
when considered in light of other important matters pending be-
fore the Commission. This second factor means a determination
that such additional expenditure is fully consistent with the Com-
mission's own assessment of overall priorities governing the alloca-
tion of its own resources. A finding of this nature should be one
prerequisite to an ultimate judgment that "good cause" exists to
permit intervention in a particular case.
But we wish to emphasize that satisfaction of the above stand-
ard, or of any other test or formula, will not automatically result
in a right of intervention. As stated previously, the exercise of
60. VA. CoNsT. art. 1X, § 2; VA. Coox. ANN. § 12.1-39 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
61. See notes 21 & 22 infra & accompanying text.
19731
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
discretion on a question of intervention depends on an assessment
of all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and each
grant or denial will have minimal, if not nonexistent, precedential
value. But as further guidance for future applicants, we would
suggest the following additional factors which will generally be
considered: the applicant's ability to contribute to the case; the
Commission's need for expedition in the handling of the case; and
the possible prejudice to the rights of original parties if interven-
tion is allowed.62
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has re-
jected the argument that providing intervenors with an effective right
of participation will render the system unmanageable. In Office of
Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, the court said:
We recognize this will create problems for the Commission but
it does not necessarily follow that 'hosts' of protesters must be
granted standing [or in this case, free transcripts] to challenge a
renewal application or that the Commission need allow the admin-
istrative processes to be obstructed or overwhelmed by captious
or purely obstructive protests. The Commission can avoid such
results by developing appropriate regulations by statutory rule
making .... 63
There would be no added expense, and little inconvenience, if the
Commission were required to transmit its own transcript as part of the
record, since each Commissioner has a copy." Moreover, since major
rate cases are supposed to come before the Commission only infre-
quently, it would not be an unreasonable expense to either the Com-
monwealth or the rate applicant to provide a "working copy" to a
public interest intervenor. Expenses could be minimized by adopting
a rule requiring that all such intervenors share the single copy and that
filing times be extended appropriately. Likewise, the court could relieve
such intervenors of a substantial burden by waiving the appendix re-
quirement under Rule 5:41.
The question as to which institution-the Commission or the utility
company-should provide the necessary transcripts seemingly does not
raise any serious problems. Assignment of the expense to either party
62. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 27 AD. L.2d 877, 879 (F.T.C. 1970).
63. 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64. Opinion letter from Attorney General Andrew P. Miller to Lieutenant Governor
Henry E. Howell, Jr., October 5, 1972.
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would spread the cost over a large segment of the public, the beneficiary
of the representation. However, imposition of the costs of appeal on
the rate applicant is already in effect in some cases in the District of
Columbia, where the Court of Appeals has upheld a District of Columbia
statute6 requiring a rate applicant to pay the costs of investigations and
appeals by the District of Columbia Public Service Commission staff,
which acts as a public interest repreentative 6
The rationale and operation of a similar system at the federal level
have been described by Lazarus and Onek:
Significantly, a mechanism is presently available to provide, at
no additional cost to the government, funds adequate to cover the
costs of providing counsel to under represented groups in many
administrative proceedings. Under Title V of the Independent
Offices Appropriations Act, agencies may assess fees from regu-
lated companies to cover the cost of license applications, rate
increase applications, route allocations, and registrations. Proceeds
from these assessments increase the general treasury. Presently the
fees assessed are low, covering only the cost of processing applica-
tions. There is, however, no reason why the fees should not be
increased to cover the costs of public participation in agency pro-
ceedings. To be sure, consumers of regulated industries would
ultimately bear the cost of this representation, but the incremental
cost would be minimal, and consumers would be unlikely to pro-
test the burden of financing advocates for their own interests-
especially since their purchases already finance the representation
of industry.
Furthermore, we believe that regulatory agencies may directly
assess the cost of public interest representation against the regu-
lated industries. For example, in any major proceeding initiated by
a regulated company involving an application or request, which if
granted would result in economic benefit to the industry, we be-
lieve that the agency could not only appoint counsel to represent
the affected public interests, but could also assess the applicant
company for the reasonable fees of those appointees.6
The SCC can adopt such a system within its legislative discretion or
by order of the Supreme Court of Virginia, since it is authorized by
65. D.C. CODE ExcYcL. ANN. § 43-412 (1969).
66. Washington Ry. & Elec. Co. v. District of Columbia, 77 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.
1935).
67. Lazarus & Onek, supra note 16, at 1100-01.
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statute to assess and collect charges from corporations as the Commis-
sion deems proper and lawful. 8 Such a proposal might take the fol-
lowing form:
1. The Commission will certify and transmit one of its transcripts
to the Supreme Court as part of the record, at no cost, to perfect the
appeal.
2. The rate applicant will be assessed the cost of one "working copy"
of the transcript, to be shared by all public interest intervenors who
have made a significant contribution to the hearing. The rate appli-
cant would have the option of providing a transcript directly to the
intervenors, if (as is usually the case) the utility has employed its
own reporter.
3. The decision as to which intervenors are "significant" may be
drawn simply, so that upon becoming a "party intervenor," a state-
ment that he lacks the necessary funds will entitle a "significant"
intervenor to obtain a transcript. The filing of written pleadings
qualifies a party as a "party intervenor." 61
CONCLUSION
Our society can no longer be operated on the principle of noblesse
oblige. No longer can reliance be placed upon generous persons or or-
ganizations of means, or even those charged by law with the duty of
providing for the general welfare. Therefore, when a public need
arises, it must be satisfied by the resources drawn from the people-
through taxes or the revenues of public utilities.
The need which so urgently presents itself is the full and effective
representation of the public in actions in which millions of dollars are
at stake. If a large segment of the public effectively is denied access to
a constitutionally and statutorily guaranteed appeal, those hundreds of
thousands of people have been deprived of property without due
process of law. If they have been denied access to the appeals process
because they have no access to a fund composed of their own monies,
68. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-19(4), (6) (Cum. Supp. 1971). Read in conjunction with
Section 12.1-32, this section provides the Commission with adequate authority to
fashion a rule requiring rate applicants to provide incidents of appeal, specifically
transcripts, to public interest interveners for meritorious appeals.
69. VA. S.C.C.R. PRAc. & P. 10. Although the term "party intervenor" is not used
in the rule, it has been adopted as a significant term by the Commission; the term
means one who is entitled to notice by reason of his filing of pleadings.
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which fund is available to their adversary for the purpose of appeal,
they have been denied the equal protection of the laws by an invidious
financial discrimination. Such a system cannot operate consistently with
a sense of fair play, with modern notions of the people's role in public
decision-making, or with the constitutions of Virginia or the United
States.
